The Media Line: Why Are Recent IS-Linked Plots in the West Increasingly Tied to South Asia? 

Why Are Recent IS-Linked Plots in the West Increasingly Tied to South Asia? 

Analysts argue that poverty, repression, and weak governance in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and beyond—not language, ethnicity, or faith—are fueling ISKP’s recruitment pipeline into Western terror attack networks.  

Giorgia Valente / The Media Line  

In recent months, a series of terrorist attacks and foiled plots across the West have reignited concerns about the evolving threat posed by the Islamic State (IS) group and its affiliates. From the deadly shooting in Washington, to the recent attack in Australia, and multiple arrests and disrupted plots across Europe, investigators have increasingly pointed to suspects connected—directly or indirectly—to IS-linked networks.  

A striking pattern has emerged in several of these cases, with a significant number of suspects originating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, or maintaining ties to networks rooted in those regions. Security analysts caution, however, that this trend should not be misread as evidence of cultural, ethnic, or religious causation. Instead, they argue, it reflects deeper structural, operational, and geopolitical dynamics shaping today’s jihadist threat.  

According to Osama Ahmad, a security analyst based in Islamabad, extremism in South Asia must be understood through socioeconomic and governance failures rather than identity-based explanations.  

“Extremism in South Asia is shaped largely by structural factors such as poverty, underdevelopment, and limited access to education in countries including India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh,” Ahmad told The Media Line.  

He noted that in Pakistan, specific regions remain particularly exposed.  

“In Pakistan, young men from tribal and marginalized regions are especially vulnerable due to weak education systems, lack of employment, and social exclusion, which extremist groups exploit through financial incentives, promises of status, and ideological narratives,” he explained.  

Ahmad stressed that analysts must resist simplistic conclusions and should avoid assuming that extremism is caused by a particular region, language, or religion, as these are not drivers in themselves. “Poverty, governance failures, and individual conditions matter more, and broad generalizations risk oversimplifying complex realities,” he said.  

For Daniele Garofalo, a counterterrorism and Islamist groups expert, the demographic shift seen in recent IS-linked plots is primarily driven by the rise of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).  

“The main driver today is ISKP—an Afghan-Pakistani base with outward export,” Garofalo told The Media Line.  

He explained that many attacks and plots previously attributed broadly to IS are now traceable to ISKP’s operational footprint.  

“In recent years, many external plots attributed to ‘Islamic State [group]’ in Europe and beyond have been linked to the Islamic State’s Khorasan province, which operates between Afghanistan and Pakistan and actively recruits in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent as well,” he noted.  

 “This inevitably shifts the ‘demography’ of radicalized and operational individuals toward Afghans, Pakistanis, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and related networks, including Bangladesh,” he added.  

Garofalo emphasized that ISKP’s success in the region is rooted in long-standing local conditions.  

“There is a reason ISKP fishes there—social and logistical sanctuaries, high-intensity grievances such as war, repression, imprisonment, and local revenge, and armed competition that produces splinters and a real ‘recruitment market,’” he explained.  

Both experts stressed that the presence of suspects from South Asian backgrounds in Western plots should not be conflated with higher radicalization within diaspora communities.  

“This does not mean diasporas are more radical; it means they are more exposed to being used as terrain for recruitment,” Garofalo said.  

He explained that large diasporas, established migration routes, and socioeconomic marginalization can lower operational barriers for terrorist networks.  

“If a community has a large diaspora in target countries, established routes such as asylum or family reunification, and socioeconomic stress, it becomes easier for an organization to identify vulnerable individuals, move facilitators, and reduce the costs of external projection,” he said. Ahmad echoed this assessment, noting that IS recruitment today is overwhelmingly digital, with exposure to IS-linked narratives largely occurring online. “Recruitment is also primarily digital, shaped by a mix of global geopolitical grievances and direct engagement by the organization itself,” he said.  

Several of the most recent plots have targeted Jewish communities, religious events, or crowded public spaces. Garofalo described this as part of a broader realignment since 2024 and argued that this apparent trend does not indicate a mysterious awakening of jihadism, but instead, a fairly brutal combination of operational factors that, from 2024 to 2025, have realigned.  

Among those factors is what he termed the “Gaza effect.”  

“Even though IS hates and criticizes Hamas, anti-Jewish and anti-Western narratives make recruitment easier,” Garofalo explained. “IS is against Hamas, but it exploits global anger as emotional and propagandistic fuel,” he said.  

Seasonality and symbolic targeting also play a role.  

“December is perfect for them—markets, religious celebrations, dense crowds, symbols that are easy to sell in propaganda,” Garofalo said, citing the foiled Christmas market plot in Bavaria as an example.  

Ahmad warned that Western security services remain ill-adapted to the digital nature of contemporary terrorism.  

“Western security services often overlook the fact that terrorist activities are primarily planned online,” he said. “By focusing mainly on offline clues, they miss the core of the problem and struggle to intercept terrorist plots before attacks occur,” he added.  

Garofalo framed prevention as a question of friction rather than eradication.  

“You need friction, making it difficult to move from intention, to capability, to opportunity,” he said, arguing for tighter integration between intelligence, digital monitoring, and administrative decision-making.  

Both experts agreed that today’s jihadist threat is less about mass mobilization and more about remote facilitation, opportunistic recruitment, and exploiting structural vulnerabilities across borders.  

As Garofalo put it, “When all these factors overlap, the numbers explode.”