The Media Line: ‘The Iranians Feel They Have Won the War’ as US-Israel Pressure Meets Diplomatic Uncertainty 

‘The Iranians Feel They Have Won the War’ as US-Israel Pressure Meets Diplomatic Uncertainty 

A possible framework on Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program has shifted the confrontation from military pause to high-risk diplomacy, with Tehran still holding key leverage 

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line 

The Iran crisis has entered one of its most dangerous phases: somewhere between open war and a possible diplomatic off-ramp. Threats are still escalating, military pressure remains high, and the core questions over Iran’s enriched uranium, missile program, proxies, and the Strait of Hormuz remain unresolved. President Donald Trump’s claim that a deal with Tehran is “largely negotiated” has changed the immediate frame from a frozen standoff to a volatile test of whether diplomacy can keep pace with military risk. 

After President Trump’s May 14-15 trip to China and his subsequent phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—reported as taking place before the US president’s May 17 Truth Social warning—the rhetoric around Iran sharply escalated. On May 17, President Trump warned Tehran on Truth Social that “the Clock is Ticking” and that Iran should move “FAST,” or “there won’t be anything left of them.” By May 24, the same crisis had also produced talk of a possible memorandum of understanding that could reopen the Strait of Hormuz and lead to further negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program. 

Despite the threats, no major retaliation has followed the latest escalation. On May 17, a drone strike targeted the Barakah nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates, causing a fire at the site’s perimeter but no reported injuries or radiological release. Emirati officials described the incident as a terrorist attack and said they reserved the right to respond. The International Atomic Energy Agency said there was no radiological release and called for restraint around nuclear facilities. 

The incident came as Netanyahu said he was due to speak with President Trump about Iran and China. “Our eyes are open regarding Iran,” Netanyahu said at the start of the weekly Cabinet meeting in Jerusalem, adding that there were “many possibilities” and that Israel was “prepared for every scenario.” 

For now, Iran’s regime is still in place. Its proxy and partner networks are still active. Its missile capabilities have not disappeared. The question of enriched uranium remains unresolved. The Strait of Hormuz remains a central card in Tehran’s pressure strategy. 

The diplomatic picture has also shifted. US officials have described progress toward an initial understanding with Iran, while Pakistan has emerged as a central facilitator and potential host for further talks. The reported framework remains uncertain, and Iranian-linked outlets have pushed back against parts of President Trump’s account, especially on control over the Strait of Hormuz. The latest diplomatic movement means the crisis can no longer be described simply as a pause after threats. It is now a race between escalation, negotiation, and the question of whether either side can accept a deal without appearing to retreat. 

Concern about Iranian-linked external operations has also become more visible after the US Justice Department announced the arrest of Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, an Iraqi national accused of supporting Iranian-backed terrorist organizations and directing attacks targeting US citizens and interests. According to the Justice Department, Al-Saadi was charged with six terrorism-related offenses connected to his alleged activities as an operative of Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. US officials alleged that he directed and urged others to attack US and Israeli interests and to kill Americans and Jews in the United States and abroad. 

Prof. Meir Litvak, a professor of Middle Eastern history at Tel Aviv University and director of the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, said the current pause may be interpreted very differently in Tehran than in Washington or Jerusalem. 

“The Iranians feel that they have won the war, that they have achieved a strategic victory over the US and Israel. Yes, they suffered destruction and casualties, but they won strategically because the regime survived,” Litvak told The Media Line. “Second, they retained the uranium. Third, they now have a major trump card: the Strait of Hormuz.” 

That reading of the conflict, he said, leaves President Trump facing a difficult set of choices. 

“Their self-confidence is high. They believe they can sustain a much longer siege against America by choking the Strait of Hormuz. This certainly puts Trump in a dilemma. I would say it is almost insoluble: He will be defeated, he will be humiliated, and it will have tremendous implications for his position,” he said. 

For Israel, Litvak said, the decisive question is whether the pressure on Iran produces a change in its nuclear posture. 

“From the Israeli government’s point of view, this is a very negative development. The hope is that pressure against Iran can somehow lead the Iranians to give up their nuclear objectives,” he said. 

The core dilemma for Washington and Jerusalem is that the war may have damaged Iran without changing the strategic fundamentals. If Iran retains enriched uranium, can rebuild nuclear infrastructure, preserves missile capabilities, and continues operating through proxies, then the outcome could look less like restored deterrence and more like an unfinished confrontation. 

“Strategically, if the war has ended now and is not going to resume, then it has ended in a strategic defeat for the US and Israel, which may have major implications for the rest of the world, including Taiwan and Ukraine,” Litvak said. 

Avraham Russell Shalev, a senior fellow at the Kohelet Policy Forum, offered a more forceful Israeli reading, arguing that the confrontation should not be judged only through the optics of Iran’s survival. While Tehran may present the regime’s endurance as a victory, he said Israel and the United States have still achieved important military results. 

“I think that there’s a gap between the United States and Israel’s accomplishments and the optics afterwards. All Iran’s leadership has to do to claim its own victory is just to survive, to have somebody still in power representing the regime. Anybody who expects the Iranian regime to surrender, that’s not going to happen,” Shalev told The Media Line. 

In that sense, Shalev argued, the campaign does not necessarily amount to a major Israeli-American defeat if it succeeded in degrading Iran’s strategic capabilities. 

“It’s not in their DNA. Besides the overthrow of the regime, which may very well happen eventually, further degradation of the ballistic missile program and the enriched uranium would be an American and Israeli victory,” he said. 

He also said that, from Israel’s perspective, the conflict with Iran is not a separate crisis but part of a wider war that began with the attacks of October 7 and continued through Tehran’s regional partners. 

“I think that in Israel, there was a lot of disappointment with the ceasefire to begin with. Israelis see the war that started on October 7, everything as part of one long war with Iran,” Shalev said. 

“As long as this regime is in power, any calm is only temporary,” he added. 

A diplomatic agreement, Litvak said, could still alter that assessment. 

“Now, you can say that if a good agreement is reached with Iran, in which Iran has to give up its uranium and is not able to redevelop its nuclear facilities, then it will be a major achievement. For how long, I don’t know,” Litvak said. 

That possibility has become more immediate since President Trump’s latest comments. Reports on the emerging framework suggest that talks could address the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian oil exports, port restrictions, nuclear limits, and Tehran’s enriched uranium stockpile. None of those points has yet been translated into a final, public agreement, and the details remain politically explosive in Washington, Tehran, and Jerusalem. 

Iran’s economic position remains under heavy pressure, a factor that could limit the regime’s ability to rebuild militarily. But Litvak cautioned against assuming that economic strain alone would produce moderation. 

“At the same time, Iran will face major economic problems, which will make things difficult for this regime. They will survive, yes, but they will face major problems,” he said. “Hopefully, they will have to divert their resources and attention from military buildup to rebuilding their economy, although you cannot be overly optimistic with the people who now rule Iran.” 

Shalev also connected the Iranian question to Israel’s unresolved fronts in Gaza and Lebanon, arguing that both Hamas and Hezbollah draw much of their strategic weight from Tehran’s support. 

“I think that it all goes back to Iran. What makes Hamas such a threat is the support that it gets from Iran. If the Iranian regime either falls or is preoccupied and cannot give the same financial and weapons support to Hamas, Hamas loses its strength. Same thing in Lebanon: Hezbollah is even more directly under Iranian control and patronage than Hamas,” Shalev said. 

“It seems that in Lebanon, Hezbollah is, for maybe one of the first times, under really significant challenge. And if they lose their Iranian patron, then you’ve gone a very big way in solving the problems in Lebanon and Gaza,” he added. 

The UAE’s position has also become more central. The drone strike on Barakah came after weeks in which Abu Dhabi found itself increasingly exposed to the regional consequences of the Iran confrontation. While the UAE has not publicly announced retaliation for the nuclear plant incident, the attack showed the extent to which Gulf states are now part of the confrontation’s operational geography. 

Litvak said Abu Dhabi’s posture reflects a broader strategic choice. 

“The UAE has been one of the major victims of Iranian aggression. They suffered more missiles and drones than Israel,” he said. “They apparently believe that they cannot tolerate an aggressive, hegemonic Iran, and decided to gamble on the American-Israeli side.” 

Saudi Arabia, he said, has handled the confrontation differently. 

“The Saudis play a sophisticated game of being on both sides, and they are also more apprehensive about Israel than the UAE,” he said. “Israel is becoming too strong. But in many ways, the UAE has always taken a much bolder position, in many fields, than other Arab countries.” 

“The UAE took a major gamble here,” he added. 

The lack of immediate US retaliation after the Barakah incident may also be read in Tehran as evidence that Washington is still hesitating. Litvak said the timing of the strike mattered. 

“It shows Iranian confidence. Maybe overconfidence,” he said. “They are certain that there will not be retaliation. And they took advantage of the fact that Trump was returning from China, so he certainly had not decided while he was in the air to attack.” 

“It also shows that the Iranian leadership is not only less cautious, but a little bit more adventurous than what we had thought,” he added. “They are overconfident, and they interpret what is going on in the world as being in their favor.” 

China is part of that calculation. President Trump’s China trip has fed speculation about whether Beijing could pressure Tehran, but Litvak rejected the idea that China would abandon Iran for Washington. 

“China will not give up on Iran. No, no, no. China is smart,” he said. “China will continue to buy Iranian oil because China wants to diversify its oil sources. It will buy from America, but it certainly will not sacrifice Iran for America.” 

A prolonged US focus on the Middle East, he said, could serve Beijing’s broader strategic interests. 

“My fear is that China is looking at what is going on, and China is very happy with the conflict with Iran because it diverts American attention from Taiwan,” Litvak said. “The US has depleted its ammunition stockpiles in Iran. It could not face China if China decided to attack Taiwan a year from now.” 

“China will not help the US against Iran, because it serves Chinese interests to have America preoccupied here, or bogged down here, in the Middle East, instead of addressing China in Southeast Asia,” he added. 

Asked about the Trump-Netanyahu call and whether it could have involved preparations for renewed military action, Litvak was cautious. 

“I don’t know. I assume they talked about Iran. But whether or not they decided to go on the attack, we cannot tell,” he said. 

Beyond missiles, uranium, and maritime pressure, one of the most difficult elements to measure is Iran’s ability to operate through external networks abroad. The recent Al-Saadi case has sharpened concern about Iranian-linked or Iran-aligned activity outside the Middle East, especially against Jewish, Israeli, American, and Western targets. 

Litvak said Iran has shown both intent and limits in this arena. 

“They can try to carry out terrorist attacks. We saw them trying to do so, not very successfully,” he said. “Usually, when they do it, it is against Israelis and Jews, not against Americans or Europeans.” 

Asked whether escalation could activate cells abroad, Litvak said the risk cannot be dismissed. 

“Yes, there is a great danger that it will happen. “The question is much more about capabilities than intentions,” he said. 

Sharon Adarlo, a conflict analyst, editor, and operations and research director at Militant Wire, said Iran is unlikely to stop using what she described as “faux proxy operations” in the West, especially after the Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) case showed how quickly a front can be constructed and deployed. 

“It has proven to be effective in the case of HAYI, in that HAYI was able to sow fear, confusion, and possibly obfuscate deadlier, more professional external operations in Europe and America,” Adarlo told The Media Line. 

“The only problem for them is that Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi and similar figures don’t seem to be utilizing proper operational security, which is why Al-Saadi was caught in the first place,” she added. 

Adarlo said she expects further arrests linked to the network, pointing to one video in particular. 

“I am sure another HAYI person will be caught because one of the HAYI videos, the drone video threatening the Israeli Embassy in London, featured two people,” she said. 

According to Adarlo, the HAYI case may offer a model for a newer form of external operation in Europe, one in which technology, online platforms, and expendable recruits are used to create a seemingly grassroots front. 

“The HAYI situation does provide a template: operatives can use technology to speedily create an astroturfed group that provides a cover for legitimate operations,” she said. “They are able to use platforms like Snapchat to hire disposable agents.” 

“What’s also interesting about HAYI and Al-Saadi is that Iraqi Shia militias are deploying external operations outside their traditional spheres of action, meaning Iraq and the Middle East,” Adarlo said. “That does not bode well for the West.” 

She said these networks are broad, adaptive, and increasingly able to draw on people motivated by money or ideological sympathy. 

“Yes, they have a strong, sprawling network that is augmented by disposable agents desperate for money,” she said. “No doubt they have had an increase in sympathizers due to the war as well.” 

Adarlo said Iraqi Shia militia groups have previously been involved in operations in Europe, but argued that the HAYI case appears different. 

“Iraqi Shia militia groups have done operations before in Europe, but this HAYI front seems like a new breed because of how it was constructed,” she said. “A new breed of external operations in Europe.” 

This external-operations dimension matters because the current confrontation is not confined to Iran’s territory. Even if direct strikes do not resume immediately, Tehran and its partners retain multiple channels of pressure: missiles, drones, maritime disruption, proxy activity in the Middle East, and alleged plots abroad. That creates a strategic gray zone in which Iran can absorb damage, preserve leverage, and test Western thresholds without necessarily triggering full-scale retaliation. 

For Litvak, containment remains possible, but not absolute. 

“Terrorist attacks can be contained. You can never destroy terrorism completely, but you can certainly limit it, and you can make it into something that is painful but tolerable,” he said. “Iran can be contained, and should be contained.” 

He said the regime’s longer-term vulnerability may still be internal: economic strain, delayed reforms, and mounting structural problems. 

“I believe, or hope, that eventually the economic difficulties will force this regime either to make major changes or to face a very deep crisis that may eventually bring its downfall,” he said. “It is not going to happen tomorrow, but I think they have major problems that I don’t see them addressing. And the longer they postpone dealing with these problems, the worse they will become.” 

For now, the standoff has not ended, but it is no longer static. President Trump is threatening and negotiating at the same time. Iranian officials are warning, denying, and bargaining. Israel is on alert. The UAE has been struck near a nuclear facility and is also on alert. Pakistan and other regional actors are trying to keep diplomatic channels open before the next military move narrows the space for a deal. 

The gap between rhetoric and action may be precisely where Iran sees room to maneuver. If no agreement forces Tehran to surrender enriched uranium, dismantle or permanently disable nuclear infrastructure, restrict its missile program, reopen the Strait of Hormuz on terms acceptable to Washington and Gulf states, and curb proxy operations abroad, the confrontation may pause without resolving the core issues that triggered it. 

Shalev’s assessment points to the other side of the strategic ledger: the conflict cannot be judged only by Iran’s survival or Tehran’s ability to claim victory. If Israel and the United States have seriously degraded Iran’s ballistic missile program and damaged its nuclear infrastructure or ability to further develop its enriched uranium stockpile, the campaign may have produced meaningful achievements even without forcing regime collapse or total surrender. 

The emerging diplomatic track may now determine which interpretation prevails. A strong agreement could turn military pressure into strategic restraint. A weak or partial deal could leave Washington and Jerusalem facing a damaged but surviving adversary with its most important levers still intact.