The Media Line: The Ceasefire Arsenal: Iran and Its Rivals Race To Reload 

The Ceasefire Arsenal: Iran and Its Rivals Race To Reload 

Depleted interceptor stocks and Iran’s recovering weapons capacity are reshaping the military balance across the region 

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line 

The 60-day negotiating window intended to move the United States and Iran toward a more durable settlement expired Aug. 17 with no comprehensive agreement, leaving behind a military balance increasingly different from the one that existed when the pause began. 

Iran has used periods of reduced fighting to repair launchers, restore access to damaged military infrastructure and accelerate missile and drone production. The United States is confronting depleted stocks of interceptors and precision weapons used during the conflict, while Gulf countries struck by Iranian missiles and drones are seeking additional air-defense systems and ammunition. Israel has accelerated production of its own interceptors and aerial munitions. 

What began as an attempt to create diplomatic space has also functioned as a period of military reconstitution. 

For Tehran, that effort has been explicit. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Commander Majid Mousavi said in April that Iran was updating and replenishing missile and drone launchers faster than before the war, although Reuters was unable to independently verify accompanying footage from an underground missile facility. 

On May 21, Reuters, citing CNN and two sources familiar with US intelligence assessments, reported that Iran had restarted some drone production during the six-week ceasefire that began in April. The news agency reported July 29 that Iran was preparing to receive an initial shipment from China of as many as 400 shoulder-fired air-defense missile launchers as Tehran rebuilt its defenses. 

The Wall Street Journal reported July 23 that satellite imagery showed Iran restoring roads and access to underground missile facilities more quickly than some Israeli officials had anticipated. The imagery also indicated reconstruction at a missile-component plant near Tehran, although more sophisticated parts of Iran’s weapons industry appeared harder to restore. 

Tehran has clearly recovered part of its ability to fight, but publicly available information does not establish that Iran has returned to its full prewar missile-production or operational capacity. 

That uncertainty is central to Israeli calculations. 

Danny Citrinowicz, a senior researcher in the Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies and a former head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division of Israel Defense Intelligence, told The Media Line that focusing solely on the number of destroyed production sites risks obscuring the arsenal Iran may still retain. 

“Nobody knows exactly how many weapons they have, but even during the friction with the US, they attacked Jordan numerous times with long ballistic missiles, so obviously they still have the capacity to launch missiles,” Citrinowicz said. “Adding to that, there are numerous reports in Israel that the Iranians were able to rebuild their manufacturing capacity—not 100%, but they have the ability to manufacture.” 

Citrinowicz said that despite what he described as operational gains during the 39-day war, Iran retained sufficient missiles and launchers to sustain hostilities for weeks or months. 

His assessment points to a structural problem exposed by the conflict. Strikes can destroy fixed production facilities, launchers and command infrastructure. They have greater difficulty eliminating technical expertise, dispersed supply networks, underground storage and the political decision to rebuild. 

Iran has spent decades developing a largely indigenous ballistic-missile industry because missiles allow Tehran to threaten targets far beyond its borders despite the limitations of its conventional air force. The war damaged that architecture but did not remove the strategic reason Iran relies on it. 

John Keith King, a strategic adviser and founder of Q Advisory, cautioned against interpreting every sign of resumed production as evidence that Iran had already restored its previous military strength. 

Public estimates have differed sharply. An Israeli Air Force official reportedly estimated in early April that Iran retained slightly more than 1,000 missiles capable of reaching Israel, while US intelligence assessments cited in American reporting placed the surviving share at roughly 70% of its prewar stockpile. Later Israeli reporting said about two-thirds of Iran’s launchers remained operational. Satellite analysis also indicated that Iran had reopened 50 of 69 entrances at 18 underground missile facilities. 

“The number of operational launchers, missile accuracy, command-and-control resilience, availability of solid-fuel components, and the ability to conduct sustained coordinated barrages are at least as important as the total number of missiles,” King told The Media Line. “Some of the current estimates originate with Israeli security sources and require continued independent verification.” 

King did not characterize the Israeli estimates as false, but said assessments based on security sources should not be treated as independently confirmed. 

That distinction could prove critical if Israel considers another preventive military campaign. 

The relevant calculation is no longer simply how many missiles Iran possesses. It is whether Tehran has enough functioning launchers, command networks and precision systems to sustain large salvos; whether Israel can identify and destroy those systems quickly enough; and whether Israeli and American missile defenses can absorb another prolonged exchange. 

Iran is not the only actor rebuilding. 

The war placed unusually heavy pressure on air-defense inventories across the region. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported May 12 that Iranian missile and drone attacks had depleted Gulf countries’ interceptor magazines and exposed capability gaps, prompting Saudi Arabia and other states to seek additional interceptors, radars, counter-drone equipment and surface-to-air systems. 

The United States faces its own replenishment problem. On Aug. 3, Washington announced framework agreements worth more than $3 billion to expand production of Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor components. The Pentagon said the agreements could eventually triple Patriot production capacity and quadruple THAAD production after the conflicts involving Iran and Ukraine strained US inventories. 

The US military awarded RTX a $22.9 billion contract Aug. 17 aimed at dramatically increasing Tomahawk production as Washington moves to replenish long-range weapons used in recent conflicts. 

It would be difficult to describe the current period simply as a pause in which Iran alone is rearming. It has become a broader regional replenishment race. 

There is no public evidence that Washington entered the ceasefire specifically to restore its weapons inventories. Still, the United States and its partners have used the same period to address shortages and strengthen defenses, particularly around the Gulf, where American bases and allied infrastructure remain within range of Iranian missiles. 

Iran is trying to restore the offensive capability needed to make another attack costly. Washington and its Gulf partners are rebuilding defensive stocks intended to absorb that capability. Israel must prepare both to defend itself against another Iranian barrage and to decide whether renewed Iranian production eventually justifies another strike. 

King described the resulting environment as something less stable than a conventional ceasefire. 

“I would describe the present situation not as peace, but as an armed pause within an unresolved conflict,” he said. “The ceasefire has not produced agreement over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, control of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions, or the future regional security structure. Both sides are therefore using the pause to rebuild military capacity and strengthen their negotiating positions.” 

According to King, the situation creates a dangerous cycle. 

“Iran’s rearmament may encourage another preventive strike, while continued American or Israeli threats convince Tehran that accelerating missile production is essential for survival,” he said. 

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the clearest examples of how little of the underlying conflict has been resolved. 

As the negotiating period expired, Iran said it was close to finalizing an understanding with Oman on routes for commercial vessels through the strait. Washington and Tehran remain divided over the larger political conditions surrounding the waterway, including the US blockade of Iranian ports and Tehran’s demand for a role in controlling passage through Hormuz. Separate efforts to restore the broader interim US-Iran arrangement produced no substantive progress before the deadline. 

Military rebuilding on all sides could reduce the margin for error while diplomacy remains unable to address the conflict’s underlying causes. 

A missile deployment interpreted as preparation for an attack, a new shipping incident, or an Israeli decision that Iranian production has crossed an unacceptable threshold could quickly transform the standoff. 

Israel’s role in that scenario is particularly complicated. 

The Israeli Defense Ministry has moved to increase production of Arrow interceptors, part of Israel’s ballistic-missile defense architecture developed jointly with the United States. It has also accelerated aerial-munitions production and moved to replenish weapons used in operations against Iran and on other fronts. 

Yet military readiness does not automatically translate into freedom of action. 

Citrinowicz argued that another major Israeli operation against Iran would remain heavily dependent on Washington, particularly if the United States sought to prevent a new round of direct fighting. 

He said Israel’s ability to conduct such an operation would be sharply constrained as long as the US administration opposed renewed escalation. He argued that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be especially reluctant to act against President Trump’s regional policy because Netanyahu also values the US president’s political support ahead of Israel’s election. 

Citrinowicz said Israel would be unlikely to expand the war as long as the United States opposed further escalation, even if Netanyahu favored doing so, because acting against US policy in the region would be difficult. 

He stressed that the dependence was structural rather than limited to one administration or military operation. 

“There is no replacement in Israel for the US support,” Citrinowicz said. “We need the US support offensively and defensively. … At the end of the day, we are highly dependent on the US.” 

He said Israel must adjust when Washington’s regional priorities diverge from those of the Israeli government. In the present case, he said, US opposition to renewed fighting would leave Israel with few realistic alternatives because it depends on American diplomatic backing, offensive support and missile defense. 

That dependency places Israel in a difficult position if Iranian missile rebuilding continues faster than expected while Washington remains reluctant to return to a large-scale offensive. 

Israel could decide that allowing Tehran additional time would make a future strike more costly. Striking sooner could trigger Iranian retaliation against Israel, US forces and Gulf infrastructure, followed by another round of American involvement. 

King said the military question could not be separated from the diplomatic one. 

“The only sustainable alternative is an enforceable agreement covering more than the nuclear issue,” he said. “It would require verifiable limitations on missile production and deployment, reliable inspection mechanisms, protected navigation through Hormuz, military deconfliction channels and phased economic incentives tied to compliance.” 

“Without such arrangements,” King said, “the region risks entering a recurring pattern in which Iran rebuilds, the United States or Israel strikes again, and every round becomes more destructive than the last.”