The Media Line: Syria One Year After Assad: A State Rebuilt in Form, Still Struggling for Power and Permanence 

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Syria One Year After Assad: A State Rebuilt in Form, Still Struggling for Power and Permanence 

Nearly 800,000 returnees face destroyed housing, limited jobs, and a rebuilding process slowed by sanctions, security gaps, and political uncertainty 

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line 

One year after the fall of Bashar Assad, Syria is no longer the institutional vacuum many had feared. Ministries function again, borders are administered by a central authority, and daily life in much of the country has shifted away from the constant fear of arrest and repression. 

Yet while the architecture of the state is re-emerging, its foundations remain strained by military vulnerability, economic paralysis, and unresolved political distrust. 

In Damascus, central squares were filled with crowds marking December 8 as the end of five decades of Assad family rule. Fireworks, flags, and impromptu street marches reflected what many residents described as a moment of collective release. But beyond the capital, the anniversary exposed deeper fractures beneath the surface of the new order. 

According to Ahmad Sharawi, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the first defining change came in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s collapse. Many observers feared a sweeping purge of Baath-era structures that would gut the state. Sharawi told The Media Line that people worried about a “process of de-Baathification, in which the entire public sector would be removed,” creating a vacuum with “no provision of services and no political continuity.” 

He said continuity quickly became the new leadership’s priority, which opted to preserve core institutions even as it pushed out many loyalists of the old regime. “But it was clear from day one that [Ahmed] al-Sharaa planned to maintain the same systems, although they did remove many people who staffed the public sector,” he added. Most of those removed, he noted, were Alawites, and “that really intensified the grievances between the Alawites and the new government in Damascus.” 

Dr. Tallha Abdulrazaq, a Middle East expert, describes the past year as a decisive turning point in Syria’s internal governance. “A definitive transition has taken root, effectively ending the ‘power vacuum’ in Syria’s interior, except in As-Suwayda and the SDF-controlled [Syrian Democratic Forces] areas,” he told The Media Line. 

From his perspective, the change inside state institutions is real, even if incomplete. “The administration has successfully reactivated state institutions, shifting them from a sectarian, security-obsessed footing to a largely functional, technocratic one—albeit still building in experience,” he added. 

Yet, he argues, the state remains strategically exposed. Abdulrazaq said the trajectory remains fragile, not because of internal chaos, where lines of confrontation with the Druze and the Syrian Democratic Forces are largely stable, but because the armed forces remain, in his words, “militarily thin.” 

“We have a government that can administer the country but cannot yet fully defend its borders, leaving it politically cohesive but strategically vulnerable,” he added. 

That fragility was visible even during the anniversary itself. While Damascus staged public celebrations, the mood elsewhere was far more muted. “I wouldn’t say all Syrians celebrated. For example, we didn’t see celebrations in As-Suwayda,” Sharawi said. 

Tensions were also evident in Kurdish-controlled regions. Sharawi said the SDF-held areas cancelled the events because local authorities did not want people openly signaling support for al-Sharaa. “The SDF-held areas cancelled the celebrations. I think they didn’t want people expressing support for al-Sharaa. That’s why I say most Syrians—because the celebrations were mainly confined to areas under al-Sharaa’s control,” he explained. 

The security sector has been one of the most turbulent arenas of the post-Assad transition. Sharawi describes a dangerously rushed early phase in which the new leadership tried to fuse disparate armed groups into a single force. “Initially, we saw a rushed integration of all security forces, in which al-Sharaa created an army composed of loose militias with divergent loyalties,” he said. 

He argues that the cost of that approach became clear in a pair of notorious incidents. The two massacres on the coast and in As-Suwayda, he said, showed what happens when troops lack a clear chain of command, demonstrating that al-Sharaa had created, in his words, “an undisciplined army that did not follow orders.” 

Over time, limited stabilization followed as the leadership tried to impose more structure. “With time, that military developed—I wouldn’t call it fully disciplined—but it began to establish a doctrine where discipline was enforced. We are now seeing fewer, let’s say, major mistakes committed by the security forces,” he stated. 

Still, violence persists in areas where state presence remains thin. “Unfortunately, there are still many clashes, criminal incidents, and sectarian killings in areas where the government presence is not strong,” Sharawi said. 

He notes that in rural areas, where security forces are scarce, revenge attacks are increasing and often target people suspected of ties to the former Assad regime. 

For Sharawi, discipline alone will not determine whether Syrians ultimately trust the new authorities. Accountability, he argues, remains the decisive test. “If al-Sharaa does hold these people accountable—and I’m not talking about just a court hearing—but seeing individuals affiliated with the army who are tried and sentenced for crimes, then that might rebuild the trust,” he said. 

Power-sharing will be just as important, in his view. Syrians, he suggested, are watching closely to see whether the leadership will genuinely open up the system. “If he shows the intention of sharing power and creating an inclusive constitution, then he might rebuild that trust. Unfortunately, he has not shown that intention yet. And that is why many groups remain wary and concerned about him amassing too much power and centralizing authority in Syria,” he added. 

Nearly 800,000 Syrians have returned over the past year—one of the most politically symbolic developments of the post-Assad period. But Abdulrazaq warns that symbolism has far outpaced capacity. “The return of 800,000 people is a vote of confidence, but let’s be blunt: the state currently lacks the physical capacity to absorb them,” he said. 

According to Sharawi, with more than $200 billion in infrastructure damage, Syria cannot sustainably reintegrate returnees without foreign investment to rebuild key facilities, and such capital will not come while the Caesar Act sanctions remain in place, which he argues must be fully lifted to allow essential construction imports and financing. “They are ready to rebuild, but the international community must first untie their hands,” he noted. 

Since Sharawi made this assessment, President Donald Trump has moved to dismantle the sanctions regime. An executive order in mid-2025 effectively halted US enforcement of the Caesar Act, and on December 10 the House of Representatives voted to repeal the law as part of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. The repeal, which Senate approval and presidential signature are expected to complete, includes periodic oversight requirements that link relief to compliance on security and human rights, and could allow sanctions to be reimposed if benchmarks are not met. 

Sharawi also sees a clear gap between political momentum and material reality. “It is extremely difficult to rebuild a country after 14 years of intense civil war,” he said. 

“Many of these people don’t have houses to return to. Entire cities in the countryside around Damascus are destroyed. It’s hard to assume that everyone will return, especially those in Western Europe who have obtained citizenship and now see a wide gap between the economic situation in Syria and a country like Germany,” he explained. 

Geography, he stresses, shapes return patterns as well as economics. “In Jordan, for example, it’s hard to imagine that a lot of these people would go back and settle in Syria right now,” he said. “Despite the removal of sanctions, many still see the situation as too fragile to return permanently,” he continued. 

For Abdulrazaq, the collapse of Assad’s war economy marked one of the few clear structural victories of the new order. “The economic freefall has finally halted, but the recovery is agonizingly slow,” he said. 

He acknowledges progress in dismantling the regime’s wartime predatory economy, including checkpoint extortion and Captagon trafficking, which has helped stabilize basic prices. At the same time, he recognizes that unemployment remains high and that living conditions are improving mainly because the security state has loosened its grip rather than due to any real recovery in purchasing power. 

Foreign investors, he notes, remain on standby. “We are seeing endless ‘scouting missions’ from the Gulf and Turkey, but actual capital inflow is frozen. Investors are ready, but their compliance departments are essentially on strike until Western sanctions are formally buried,” he commented. 

At the domestic level, Sharawi points to a rare bottom-up mobilization. He said Syrians inside and outside the country have poured money into reconstruction. “If we combine all provinces, they’ve raised locally more than $1 billion in the past five months to rebuild. These are Syrians—including Syrians living abroad—donating money,” he said. 

Beyond security and economics, Sharawi points to the slow and uncertain construction of Syria’s political and judicial institutions. “When it comes to the political transition, we saw what I call ‘parliamentary selections’ that were conducted in October. Al-Sharaa still has to appoint 70 individuals to finalize the parliament, and there has been no action since October on that front. That process still has not finished,” he said. 

Concerning the judiciary, Sharawi said that judges have been appointed in Syria. However, there is still no clarity on how they were chosen or what judicial system will ultimately underpin the country’s laws. 

Abdulrazaq sees recent political moves by al-Sharaa as calculated acts of state-building aimed at broadening the new leader’s base. “Al-Sharaa understands that in post-Assad Syria, broadening his legitimacy is the absolute prerequisite for enacting painful reforms,” he said. “His recent gestures are a calculated signal to both the West and skeptical domestic minorities that the ‘revolutionary commander’ has fully transitioned into a ‘national statesman’. This is political theatre, certainly, but it is the essential kind of theatre required to hold a fragile society together while the real institutional work begins,” he added. 

Sharawi remains far more cautious. “Unfortunately, he has not yet shown that intention,” he said. “That is why many groups remain wary and concerned about him amassing too much power and centralizing authority in Syria,” he explained. 

Beyond institutions, both experts point to a quieter transformation unfolding inside Syrian society. “The era of the ‘wall of fear’ is over,” Abdulrazaq said. 

He mentions that a prime example occurred recently when Alawite protests in the coastal region were not only tolerated but actively protected by the new, Sunni-majority security forces. “Under the old regime, dissent was met with bullets; today, it is met with a security cordon to ensure safety,” he observed. 

Sharawi sees the human impact most clearly in reunions long thought impossible. “Anyone who left Syria in the past would have been arrested if they returned,” he said. “These people lived in fear for more than 14 years, and now we see people visiting again, families reuniting. … This is an important change—a positive change,” he concluded. 

One year after Assad, Syria no longer stands as a void, but as a state reassembled under pressure. Institutions function; fear has receded; public life has tentatively returned. Yet sanctions, unresolved issues on its borders with Lebanon and Israel, economic weakness, and deep political mistrust still define Syria’s fragile horizon. 

For now, Syria can govern itself. Whether it can defend itself—and fully rebuild itself—remains the unanswered question of its post-Assad future. =