The Media Line: Oil Above $100 Puts US Politics and Saudi Security Under Pressure 

Oil Above $100 Puts US Politics and Saudi Security Under Pressure 

Higher fuel costs threaten the US economy ahead of the midterms as Houthi attacks expose Saudi energy infrastructure and export routes 

By Giorgia Valente/The Media Line 

Oil prices climbed back above $100 a barrel on Wednesday as a renewed confrontation between the United States and Iran around the Strait of Hormuz converged with a sharp escalation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis, exposing two different but increasingly interconnected consequences of the regional conflict. 

For Washington, the immediate impact remains largely economic: higher gasoline and diesel prices, renewed inflationary pressure, and a potentially damaging issue ahead of the midterm elections, despite high US domestic production and additional supply from Venezuela. 

In Riyadh, the threat is considerably more physical. Houthi missiles and drones have again reached Saudi cities and energy infrastructure, raising questions not only about the security of Saudi oil exports but also about whether the recently established Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan could face its first practical test. 

The escalation intensified after US forces destroyed five Iranian oil tankers, and Iran responded by attacking shipping near Hormuz and launching ballistic missiles toward a base in Jordan used by American forces. Jordan said it intercepted 18 of 20 missiles, with no casualties reported, illustrating how a confrontation centered heavily on Gulf shipping is increasingly placing other US regional partners under pressure. 

At the same time, Houthi attacks struck southern Saudi Arabia, injuring 73 people and setting oil infrastructure ablaze. Brent crude subsequently moved above $100 for the first time since July, while West Texas Intermediate climbed above $95. 

John King, founder of Q Advisory, said the latest movement reflects a combination of actual supply disruption and a rapidly expanding geopolitical premium. 

“The sharp rise during the latest exchange, however, is driven more heavily by geopolitical risk. Markets are pricing what could happen next: further attacks on tankers, damage to major Gulf production facilities, disruption in the Red Sea, and the possibility that the confrontation spreads to additional oil-producing countries. Some market estimates place this risk premium at approximately $15 to $16 per barrel,” he told The Media Line. 

“My assessment is therefore that the physical disruption explains the elevated foundation of today’s market, while the escalation premium explains much of the latest surge toward and above $100,” King added. 

That distinction matters particularly for the United States. Domestic oil production makes the country more resilient than during previous energy crises, but American crude and refined products remain tied to globally determined prices. 

“The United States is substantially less vulnerable to an oil shock than it was during the 1970s, but it is far from insulated. High domestic production improves energy security and supports employment and investment in producing states. It does not protect American consumers from globally determined crude prices or guarantee an adequate domestic supply of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel,” King said. 

Regular US gasoline is now around $4.22 per gallon, while diesel is approaching $6. Meanwhile, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve has fallen to approximately 285 million barrels, its lowest level since 1982, reducing one of Washington’s principal cushions against prolonged supply disruption. Brent has risen about 25% over the past month, while industry estimates suggest that roughly one-third of Gulf oil exports remain absent compared with prewar levels, despite tankers continuing so-called “dark crossings” through Hormuz. 

Venezuelan oil offers some additional flexibility, particularly for US Gulf Coast refineries built to process heavier crude, but not enough to compensate for the loss of several million barrels from the Middle East. 

“Venezuelan oil can provide useful marginal relief, particularly for US Gulf Coast refineries designed to process heavy, sulfur-rich crude. However, it cannot come close to replacing a major Middle Eastern supply disruption in the short term,” King said. 

That leaves the Trump administration exposed to an increasingly visible domestic consequence of the conflict ahead of the midterms. 

“Ahead of the midterms, sustained prices at these levels would create a significant liability for the party controlling the White House and Congress. Voters rarely distinguish precisely between global commodity markets, refinery constraints, and presidential policy. They generally hold the governing party responsible for whether their cost of living is improving or deteriorating,” King said. 

Saudi Arabia faces a different equation. 

The kingdom is not the Gulf state most structurally dependent on Hormuz. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iraq have fewer alternatives if the strait remains severely disrupted. Saudi Arabia can divert significant volumes through its East-West Pipeline toward Yanbu on the Red Sea, while the United Arab Emirates has its Fujairah route outside Hormuz. 

But the Houthi escalation creates a distinctive double exposure for Riyadh: Saudi Arabia may be better equipped to bypass Hormuz, yet its alternative export network shifts part of the risk toward the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb—the same broader theater in which the Houthis can threaten shipping and Saudi infrastructure directly. 

“Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are substantially better positioned. Saudi Arabia can move crude across the country to Yanbu on the Red Sea, while the UAE can export through Fujairah, outside Hormuz,” King said. 

However, he cautioned that “published pipeline capacities should not be confused with reliably available capacity during wartime,” adding that “Saudi Arabia’s western route also transfers part of the risk to the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb corridor.” 

The latest Houthi attacks therefore affect more than production figures. They challenge Saudi Arabia’s ability to protect both domestic infrastructure and the alternative routes designed to make the kingdom more resilient to a Hormuz crisis. 

They also arrive at a particularly important political moment. 

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, establishing a framework in which aggression against one member is treated as aggression against all. The mechanism has already begun moving beyond the signing stage. 

On August 31, the three countries held the first meeting of their Strategic Political and Defense Committee in Istanbul and agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially led for three years by a Pakistani secretary-general. The joint statement said the countries would further institutionalize cooperation and strengthen the credibility of collective deterrence and defense. 

Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif has explicitly said the pact could become operational if the Yemen conflict spills into Saudi Arabia, arguing that Pakistan is bound by the agreement’s collective-defense provisions. 

Turkey has so far adopted a more cautious public position. Ankara strongly condemned the Houthi attacks on September 8 and reaffirmed support for Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but has not publicly announced any prospective military involvement. 

Abdulaziz Alshaabani, a Saudi political expert, said the timing makes the escalation particularly important. 

“The recent Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia represent a significant escalation, particularly as they targeted civilian and energy infrastructure. What makes the situation more significant is that it comes only weeks after the signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan,” he told The Media Line. 

“Pakistan’s Defense Minister has now made clear that the agreement could become operational if the conflict in Yemen spills over into Saudi territory, reaffirming that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all,” he added. 

Yet Alshaabani cautioned against interpreting the agreement as an automatic mechanism for direct intervention. 

“In my view, the immediate significance of the agreement is deterrence rather than automatic military intervention,” he noted. 

“If Houthi attacks continue or intensify, however, the agreement could move from being primarily a political and strategic commitment to becoming a practical framework for coordinated defense and collective deterrence,” he added. 

That may ultimately prove to be the more consequential question surrounding the pact: not whether Turkish or Pakistani forces immediately enter the Yemen conflict, but whether sustained attacks on Saudi territory accelerate practical intelligence, air defense, maritime, or other forms of military coordination among the three countries. 

The widening confrontation is producing very different forms of vulnerability. 

For the United States, the effects remain largely indirect but are increasingly difficult to separate from domestic politics: oil above $100, expensive gasoline and diesel, inflationary pressure, and a reduced strategic reserve, with Venezuelan supply unable to rapidly compensate for large-scale Gulf disruption. 

For Saudi Arabia, those same oil-market pressures are accompanied by missiles and drones reaching its territory, attacks on energy infrastructure, and renewed insecurity around the Red Sea route intended to provide an alternative to Hormuz. 

If both Hormuz and Saudi Arabia’s western export corridor become increasingly exposed at the same time, the distinction between a temporary geopolitical premium and a deeper supply crisis could narrow further. 

And for the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the Houthi escalation may now provide its first substantive test: whether collective defense remains primarily a deterrent message or begins to translate into practical security coordination as the war moves closer to Saudi territory.