The Media Line: Meeting Between Netanyahu and Egyptian Intelligence Chief Transforms Tactical Dialogue Into Strategic Cooperation 

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Meeting Between Netanyahu and Egyptian Intelligence Chief Transforms Tactical Dialogue Into Strategic Cooperation 

Senior INSS researcher Ofir Winter posits that Israel and Egypt may update peace agreement to allow both armies to strengthen border security 

 By Giorgia Valente/The Media Line 

Two days after a discreet, strategic meeting between Egyptian and Israeli officials at the prime minister’s office in Jerusalem, both sides signaled renewed efforts to turn months of back-channel security coordination into a blueprint for Gaza’s “day after”—and to reset brittle Egypt–Israel ties. On Oct. 21, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met Hassan Rashad, Egypt’s intelligence chief, for talks focused on Gaza, border security and bilateral coordination, according to Israeli officials. 

The visit followed a tense week surrounding the Sharm El Sheikh summit, during which some leaders indicated they would not attend if Netanyahu did. The Israeli leader ultimately withdrew, formally citing a clash with the holiday of Simhat Torah. The episode highlighted the regional sensitivities Cairo must navigate even as it maintains channels with Israel. 

“This high-level meeting also marks a return to Egypt’s pragmatic approach in balancing its relationships with Israel, its role as a regional mediator and domestic public opinion. By engaging in discreet diplomacy, Egypt demonstrates its ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters while maintaining its influential position in the Middle East,” said Samir Ragheb, director of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies, to The Media Line. 

The central theme of the Jerusalem talks, Israeli and regional analysts say, is shifting from mere conflict management to defining Gaza’s long-term future. Israeli and Egyptian services have kept up quiet coordination throughout the war. The goal now, said Ofir Winter, senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), is to lift that cooperation “from the tactical level to the strategic one.” 

“Israeli and Egyptian security officials have been in contact throughout the war. Even in the absence of direct dialogue between el-Sisi and Netanyahu, the quiet security-strategic dialogue between the agencies has been largely maintained and helped bridge tactical gaps and prevent misunderstandings between the sides,” Winter told The Media Line. 

“The current challenge is to rise from the tactical level to the strategic one—formulating a long-term vision for the Gaza Strip in order to enable advancement of Trump’s plan and transition from Phase 1 to subsequent phases that will include the reconstruction of Gaza, reopening of the Rafah crossing, entry of international and Palestinian forces into the Strip, disarmament of Hamas, establishing new parameters for IDF deployment in Gaza, and formulation of an alternative government in the Strip that does not include Hamas,” he added. 

“The meeting could also be an opportunity for Egypt to assess the Israeli position and explore solutions to the current impasse,” said Ragheb. 

Winter’s emphasis on phased implementation echoes proposals circulating in Washington this month that outline demilitarization steps, monitored crossings, and a combined international–Palestinian stabilization presence under the US framework. 

On the ground, Rafah crossing remains pivotal, with talks linking any reopening to ceasefire mechanics, hostage deal timetables and enduring security arrangements along the Philadelphi Corridor. Israel and Egypt are weighing options for surveillance, inspection and interdiction that both satisfy postwar realities and adhere to treaty commitments. 

Winter argued that Egypt and Israel must lock in “new and reliable security arrangements” for the Philadelphi Corridor and the movement of people and goods at Rafah, including technology upgrades and institutional mechanisms. He also raised the option of updating the Camp David military annex to allow adjusted force deployments on both sides of the border to rebuild trust: 

“Israel believes that part of Hamas’s military buildup before Oct. 7 came from Egypt. Therefore, the challenge will be to formulate new and reliable security arrangements for monitoring the Philadelphi Corridor and for overseeing the passage of people and goods at the Rafah crossing,” Winter explained. 

“This will require the use of appropriate technologies and establishment of mechanisms. It may also be appropriate to update the military annex to the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in a way that will allow both armies to strengthen border security, formulate updated agreements regarding the deployment of military forces on both sides and rebuild the trust relations that were somewhat damaged during the war,” he added. 

For Samir Ragheb, the Jerusalem visit fits Egypt’s broader playbook: keep diplomacy quiet, maintain leverage with all sides, and avoid inflaming domestic opinion while doing the hard work of de-escalation. 

“The visit underscores Egypt’s multifaceted approach to regional diplomacy. By engaging in direct talks with Israeli leadership, Cairo aims to ease tensions, maintain open channels of communication and potentially pave the way for future initiatives,” Ragheb added. 

“From my point of view, this discreet diplomatic channel may serve as an alternative to more public forums, allowing for frank discussions on sensitive issues,” he further added. 

Winter called Egypt “an essential partner” for the day after, given the shared border, ties to Palestinian factions and international trust. 

“Egypt is an essential partner of Israel in the day after the war, given its shared border with Gaza, its connections with the Palestinian factions, the trust placed in it by the international community and the US, and the roles it is designated to fulfill in the reconstruction processes and its implementation,” he said. 

“Egypt’s diplomatic maneuvering reflects its efforts to maintain influence over regional security matters, particularly concerning the Gaza Strip and broader Palestinian issues,” Ragheb said. 

“A renewed opening of the Rafah crossing will also strengthen Egypt’s leverage vis-à-vis Hamas. Unlike Qatar and Turkey, which are interested in Hamas’s survival as an influential factor in the Palestinian arena, Israel and Egypt also share the view that sees Hamas as a radical Islamist factor that endangers regional stability. On the other hand, they are still divided on the question of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) return to Gaza,” Winter added. 

For a durable reset, Winter said Israel’s priority is clear: demilitarize Gaza and disarm Hamas through close Egypt–Israel cooperation on border control and training an alternative Palestinian force—while Israel must, in turn, offer a credible political horizon, including conditions for a reformed PA in Gaza and progress toward a two-state framework. 

“The top priority from Israel’s perspective is Egypt’s commitment to demilitarizing Gaza and disarming Hamas, and here close cooperation between the two countries will be required around border control, training of an alternative Palestinian force to Hamas, and taking the steps that will enable the exclusion of Hamas from government in the Gaza Strip,” Winter said. 

“To gain Egypt’s full cooperation, Israel will be required on its part to create a credible political horizon—even if conditional and gradual—for the return of a reformed Palestinian Authority to Gaza and to create a political horizon for implementing the two-state framework,” he added. 

Ragheb framed the same trade-offs through Cairo’s domestic lens. 

“While security cooperation with Israel remains a sensitive topic domestically, such engagements signal Egypt’s commitment to playing an active role in regional affairs. As tensions persist and public summits face obstacles, this behind-the-scenes diplomacy may prove crucial in shaping the future of Middle Eastern politics and fostering stability in the region,” he said. 

Both analysts see escalation risks if Israel advances steps Cairo defines as red lines. 

“Escalation is expected if Israel returns to discussing or advancing plans that concern Egypt and are perceived by Cairo as a red line, particularly encouraging voluntary emigration of Gazans to Egypt or other countries, annexation of Palestinian territories, or a return to a full-scale war,” Winter said. 

“By maintaining open channels with both Israeli and Arab leadership, Egypt can potentially broker agreements or defuse tensions that might otherwise escalate into larger conflicts. However, the success of this balancing act remains to be seen,” Ragheb said.