The Media Line: Israel’s Hopes for IMEC: New Delhi, Gulf Investors and Washington Push Corridor Forward Despite Gaza War and Tariff Shocks 

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Israel’s Hopes for IMEC: New Delhi, Gulf Investors and Washington Push Corridor Forward Despite Gaza War and Tariff Shocks 

Israel’s planners view IMEC as an opportunity to transition from an ‘island economy’ to a land-sea hinge 

By Jacob Wirtschafter / The Media Line 

Backed by Washington and eyed warily in Beijing, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is transitioning from a blueprint to a buildout. For New Delhi, it’s a bid to lock in Gulf markets and anchor ties to Europe, despite fresh US tariffs and Gulf hesitation over the Gaza war. 

“IMEC is primarily a commercial connectivity initiative to bring India closer to markets in the Gulf, the broader Middle East, and Europe,” Sreeram Chaulia, dean of the Jindal School of International Affairs, told The Media Line. “With the UAE alone, our trade has quadrupled in hardly five years, and we are approaching $100 billion in bilateral trade. Investment is also growing exponentially. Add to that our large diaspora in the Gulf—more than 10 million people—and India will look to have significant influence, both commercial and geopolitical, in these regions going forward.” 

From New Delhi’s perspective, the corridor is a practical way to harden supply chains, leverage the Gulf’s mega-ports, and feed Europe without relying entirely on the Suez Canal. After the 2022 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, India–UAE trade nearly doubled to $83.7 billion in 2023–24, according to India’s Ministry of Commerce. 

But the partnership has been tested. The Trump administration slapped 50% tariffs on Indian exports such as textiles and gems, citing New Delhi’s continued purchases of discounted Russian oil. The dispute rattled markets and cast a shadow over US–India trade, even as both governments insisted IMEC would move forward on a separate track. 

Chaulia, author of Friends, Foes, and Future Directions: US–India Relations in the Trump Era, said politics are aligning across capitals. “Netanyahu called IMEC ‘the greatest project of the 21st century.’ For him, it would be the crowning achievement of his career—securing Israel’s legitimacy and cooperation with its neighbors. For Modi, the westward orientation is a no-brainer. Gulf trade is booming, negotiations with the EU are advancing, and IMEC provides diversification beyond the US and East Asia. So both leaders are steady and persistent on IMEC, even through the Gaza war.” 

He also argued that the financing math works. “The Gulf states and Europeans will finance IMEC because it provides another land route apart from the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Europe has a major stake in expanding commerce with the Gulf. For them, IMEC is the pathway—more pipelines, more container shipments, reduced tariffs, and quicker delivery.” 

And the security ties highlight the bet. Israel is now one of India’s top four defense partners, alongside Russia, France, and the US In some areas, Israel goes further than Washington in technology transfer, with fewer restrictions. Trust levels are high, and cooperation continues to deepen. That’s why IMEC matters: it links India’s economic future with Israel’s legitimacy and regional integration. 

Israel’s planners view IMEC as an opportunity to transition from an “island economy” to a land-sea hinge. 

“IMEC offers Israel a strategic opportunity to position itself as a transit hub between Asia and Europe and to strengthen its regional ties—but the initiative faces geopolitical challenges that require strategic planning and smart regional cooperation,” said Nir Levitan of Bar-Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, who co-authored a January 2025 study on IMEC with colleagues Arie Reich and Jonathan Rynhold. 

Levitan said the opportunity hasn’t vanished despite Gaza. “The opportunities are still there, even if normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is on hold because of the war in Gaza. There are ongoing discussions behind the scenes, including under ‘letter diplomacy,’ and Washington wants to push at least some of the trade routes forward. There is great potential for a digital corridor—an alternative to the Suez Canal—given the demand for higher speed and expanded capacity.” 

He said groundwork continues quietly. “Jordan and the Gulf states—the UAE, Bahrain, possibly Oman, and of course Saudi Arabia—all have an interest in promoting IMEC. But they cannot move without a broader agreement. For now, they are engaging unofficially: academics, business circles, and private meetings with Israelis continue, preparing the ground for future progress.” 

Levitan pointed to the nuts and bolts already in motion. “Israel is already working on a rail line near Beit She’an to connect with Jordan. There are feasibility studies about linking the two networks, and also exploring other solutions beyond rail. The idea is to build on existing cooperation but expand it dramatically.” 

His 10-year picture is a multi-layered land bridge. “I hope to see a functioning land corridor … not only railways and goods, but also digital communications, undersea cables, and energy infrastructure. Israel can become a dominant player in digital connectivity, AI, quantum technologies, and renewable energy—cooperating with India, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates—provided they bring the financing to the table.” 

Momentum gained bureaucratic muscle in Washington this summer when lawmakers introduced the Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act, a bill that ties US policy to the western hinge of the IMEC and seeks to deepen defense, energy, and infrastructure coordination with Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. 

At the same time, a new Atlantic Council N7 Initiative report laid out an operational playbook: about 40% shorter transit times and 30% lower logistics costs if the corridor’s middle leg is built out; 1.5 million containers annually at first, scalable to 3 million with double-stack cargo rail and integration of Ashdod with Haifa. The catch is the hinge everyone mentions—Jordan needs a national railway, a project think tanks say IMEC could finally catalyze. 

“Jordan doesn’t have a national railway as of now. So that is going to be the critical element to get at least the corridor ready,” said Afaq Hussain, co-author of the N7 report. “With this link, Israel is then the gateway port to the Mediterranean … Haifa and Ashdod should be linked … we reach around 3 million TEUs now, with plans to enhance to 5 million.” His co-author Nick Shafer added: “Jordan is also pivotal for the long-term future of integration in the region.” 

Dane Johnston, a deputy assistant secretary at the State Department, told the N7 launch event that US involvement is explicit. “People ask, with ‘India–Middle East–Europe’ in the name, why is the United States involved—especially with this administration’s America-first approach? The answer’s simple. In February, when Prime Minister Modi visited the White House, President Trump reaffirmed America’s endorsement of IMEC—he’s done so several times.” 

He said governance is slowly taking shape. “Earlier this month I was in India for the first in-person meeting of all the MOU signatories—the Saudis couldn’t attend. We laid the foundation for a common vision and how to move forward. We’re still working through governance details, but there’s broad consensus to have a ministerial later this year.” 

And he pointed to pilots already proving the model. “You can argue IMEC is already happening—trucks are moving from the UAE to Israel and on to Europe. Governments need to harmonize and make it cheaper and easier. One approach is pilot projects—test on the ground before big commitments. The enthusiasm in Abu Dhabi and Dubai is real; business leaders know IMEC and want in.” 

Johnston stressed that the corridor isn’t meant to replace Suez. “Economic security is national security. IMEC isn’t replacing the Suez; it’s an alternative that builds trade resiliency. We’ve seen how disruptions hit America and the world. Some conflicts in the region actually strengthen the case for IMEC.” 

At sea, the UAE has the cranes and the servers. Jebel Ali handled its best volumes since 2015 last year, emphasizing its role as IMEC’s “front door.” Israeli ports are smaller, but Haifa and Ashdod are being tooled as gateway terminals feeding short-sea loops to Europe—if Jordan’s tracks materialize. 

On the ground, Plan B has been trucks. Since the Red Sea turned risky, back-to-back trucking from UAE and Bahraini ports through Saudi Arabia and Jordan into Israel has shaved days off transit, according to shippers—even as Amman publicly denies any official “land bridge.” Industry insiders view it as proof of concept for IMEC’s overland leg, while the region navigates Houthi threats and war-risk premiums. 

Turkey’s absence shows why IMEC is as much about diplomacy as logistics. “Turkey’s exclusion from IMEC makes it an odd player,” Sinan Ciddi, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told The Media Line. Ankara has built its own energy and trade infrastructure independent of the West, he noted, and sees the Eastern Mediterranean as its domain. That makes Turkey less a missing piece than a spoiler, especially if US diplomacy mismanages ties. “If Washington mishandles relationships—particularly with Turkey—IMEC could lose momentum,” Ciddi said. 

If Turkey is out, Saudi Arabia is seething. Since January, Riyadh has sharpened its public tone. It rejected Netanyahu’s suggestion that Palestinians could be relocated to Saudi territory, branded Israel “extremist” for blocking Arab ministers from visiting the West Bank, and called plans to occupy Gaza City a “war crime.” State media mocked Netanyahu’s “Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia” quip as delusional. The anger peaked on July 7, when Netanyahu told reporters at the White House: “If people want to stay, they can stay. But if they want to leave, they should be able to leave.” To Saudi ears, that sounded like a callous endorsement of expulsion. 

Since then, Riyadh has gone silent on IMEC, leaving the private sector to talk. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman tapped ACWA Power to represent Saudi Arabia on the project. Its CEO, Marco Arcelli, said the company has $117 billion invested across power, desalination, and hydrogen, with solar running at $11 per megawatt-hour and feasibility studies on a Saudi–Europe power corridor due by year’s end. But even Arcelli cautioned that speed is critical: “With quick decisions, the corridor can be built on a five-to-10-year horizon. Speed matters—faster approvals lower risk and make IMEC projects bankable.” 

Across the Gulf, the hesitation is plain. Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla told The Media Line that Netanyahu’s “arrogance” and “Greater Israel” rhetoric have made Israel too destabilizing to embrace publicly. Yet he argued the economics are irresistible. “World trade is expanding at least 5 to 10 percent a year, and it needs new corridors. IMEC adds to that,” he said. For the UAE, the goal is clear: to cement itself as the airport and seaport of the 21st century. His advice: separate Gaza diplomacy from IMEC. “Maybe we need to delink the two,” Abdulla said. “IMEC shouldn’t be hostage to that.” 

Meanwhile, Iran and China are quietly cheering the setbacks. Tehran openly hailed Hamas’ Oct. 7 assault as a victory against Israel. Beijing, analysts note, was pleased too—seeing a rival to its Belt and Road stalled just weeks after launch. Hezbollah-aligned outlets like The Cradle spelled it out: resistance in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen keeps Israel’s infrastructure under threat and delays US-led projects, creating what they called a “multipolar delay.” 

Western analysts read the same events differently. Washington think tanks argue that Hamas and its Iranian backers struck not only at Israel but at the broader project of Arab–Israeli normalization. The Heritage Foundation called the Oct. 7 assault “a calculated effort to undermine the positive momentum” begun with the Abraham Accords—and said IMEC now represents the most promising way to restart that momentum and secure US-led prosperity in the region. 

For India and its partners, the calculus is simpler: demand is already there, the diaspora is embedded in Gulf economies, and the trade routes can’t wait for perfect politics. 

“IMEC is a portfolio play,” Chaulia said. “India will keep building its western arteries because the demand is there, the diaspora is there, and the Gulf is structurally aligned.”