The Media Line: Has President Trump Put the Kurds at Risk by Backing al-Sharaa and HTS Against Islamic State?

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Has President Trump Put the Kurds at Risk by Backing al-Sharaa and HTS Against Islamic State?

Washington’s nod to Damascus, limited sanctions relief, and new anti-Islamic State coordination narrow Kurdish leverage and keep the SDF guarding thousands of detainees

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line

Washington just put weight behind Damascus’ plan to fold the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state—narrowing Kurdish room to maneuver while leaving them to guard thousands of Islamic State detainees. That message followed a Nov. 10, 2025 meeting in Washington between President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, which gave Damascus public US acknowledgment, limited sanctions relief, and a channel to press “territorial integrity.” It also returned the March 10, 2025 SDF–Damascus integration agreement to active renegotiation at the top level.

In practical terms, Washington’s stance strengthens Damascus’ hand in integrating the SDF into state command structures while Kurdish leaders say key protections and timelines remain unfulfilled.

Interviews conducted by The Media Line with Juan Saadoun, a Syrian Kurdish media activist now based in Canada, and Henry Barkey, adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, capture that tension. Both describe a Kurdish position that still matters—because of prisons, local networks, and the regime’s reliance on them—but one clearly narrower than before March.

Integration that narrows Kurdish space—but doesn’t erase it

Saadoun argues that Arab media overstated what the March and October texts accomplished. “The official integration (as is being promoted in the Arab media) reduces the autonomy of the security and administrative arenas that were under the control of the Autonomous Administration, but it does not remove them completely and immediately. The texts of the agreements (as were submitted in March and October) grant Damascus broader powers over sensitive points such as airports, crossings, and oil fields,” he told The Media Line.

He immediately explained why the Kurdish side still has room to maneuver. “This means the Kurds’ influence will shrink compared to what they possessed before integration, but it does not vanish. As long as implementation is slow, uneven, and selective, we still have short-term leverage—local networks, community bases, trained combat units—and we can still negotiate,” he added.

Another point he emphasized is the divergence between Kurdish media and the official narrative. “And often what is promoted inside the Kurdish milieu is different from what we hear in the media, as the media bodies affiliated with the Autonomous Administration state that Damascus is the one evading the implementation of the March agreement and the completion of the integration process,” he noted.

That divergence matters more after the al-Sharaa–Trump meeting: Damascus can now tell its public that the US has “reaffirmed” March 10, while Kurdish outlets will continue to say the central government is delaying the real steps.

Centralization without political concessions

Where Saadoun pushes hardest is the gap between what Damascus has already taken back and what it has yet to offer. “If it is taken into account that Damascus obtained, under the agreement, control over central economic and security joints, the balance tilts in favor of Damascus in the medium term unless the Kurdish forces maintain an independent operational and political capacity,” he said.

He then listed the missing, symbolically important steps for Kurds. “As evidence, Damascus has not yet carried out any constitutional reform or amendment regarding the Kurds and the minorities such as the Alawites, Druze, and Christians, and has not taken any initiative that shows good will to achieve national reconciliation and hold accountable those involved in the massacres of the Alawites and Druze or even to achieve peace and democracy in the pillars and institutions of the state,” he said.

For that reason, Saadoun calls talk of “completed” integration premature. “Therefore, the issue of the completion of integration and its success is still illogical and far-fetched,” he said.

US unpredictability is reducing Kurdish bargaining power

Barkey viewed the same landscape from Washington and made an important correction: Damascus is not suddenly strong on all fronts. “Damascus is weaker than it was because of the problems with the Druze and other minorities. HTS [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist faction rooted in al-Qaida’s former Syrian affiliate], which really is the Syrian Army, is smaller than SDF and not as well trained,” he told The Media Line. (HTS is not the Syrian Arab Army; Barkey was arguing its de facto role in parts of the north.)

He added that Kurdish leverage has slipped not only because Damascus clawed back strategic assets but also because the American line is hard to read. “If the Kurds are losing some bargaining power, it is because of the US administration’s unpredictability. The US military is still invested in fighting ISIS with SDF, although they have started joint operations with HTS,” he said, using an abbreviation for Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (Syria), a name the group later shortened to Islamic State.

US unpredictability is exactly what the al-Sharaa–President Trump meeting put on display: Washington can praise the Syrian president’s ‘stabilizing role’ and still expect the Kurds to hold thousands of Islamic State prisoners.

“The leverage the Kurds have remain to be the prisons. Not much progress has been made in reducing the numbers. Does the Int’l community want HTS to run the prisons full of jihadis?” he noted.

Barkey’s point is blunt: Kurdish leverage persists because they control the prisons.

For now, the answer is no, which helps explain why Kurdish leverage has shrunk but not disappeared.

Turkey: threat as tool, not always intent

Both interviewees converged on Ankara’s role. Saadoun described it from the border vantage point: “Ankara retains a real military capability to carry out cross-border operations, and it repeats the warning whenever it feels that the presence of Kurdish forces near its borders may revive security threats or PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] movements,” he said.

Even so, he argued, conditions for a large, costly incursion are not fully present. “The integration … may ease some Turkish pressure … but it will not close the file if Ankara continues to suspect that factions or networks affiliated with the PKK are capable of operating from deep inside Syria. Ankara’s latest statements confirm the continuation of the threat as a real tool of pressure, but in my view, they remain hollow, or if they are carried out, they will be limited and fruitless,” he said.

Barkey added the Washington and domestic-Turkish angle—especially relevant with al-Sharaa and Turkish officials in Washington at the same time. “Turkey keeps threatening, but I do not think it will. The reason is that as much as Washington is backing Turkey and al-Sharaa, it does not want Syria story to go negative,” he said.

He also linked a Syrian incursion directly to Turkey’s own Kurdish question. “A Turkish intervention would … destroy it because for Turkish Kurds, the Syrian Kurds are extremely important. They have an almost emotional attachment to them. A Turkish intervention would not only stop the process but give rise to domestic protests, potentially turning violent,” he said.

Politics inside Turkey, he warned, are moving in the opposite direction. “What the Kurds want, basically democracy in Turkey, is exactly what Erdogan seems doing everything to extinguish. As one leading Kurdish parliament member said, ‘you cannot have democracy in Diyarbakir, and fascism in Istanbul,’” he added.

PKK ‘peace’ track, leverage, and risks

This is where Saadoun’s longer view of the PKK “peace” track adds context for readers. For him, what is labeled a peace process looks one-sided on the Kurdish side. “In other words, disarmament in Turkey paves the way for negotiating opportunities but it also creates implementation conditions that may weaken the Kurdish positions in Syria if they are not accompanied by clear international and regional guarantees,” he said.

He then drew a sharper line. “But what we find today is that the peace process is in fact a complete surrender by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its leader Abdullah Öcalan … what we hear from him as a political detainee is the fulfillment of the Turkish state’s demands only … which contradicts the founding resolutions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in the first place!!” he noted.

That is why, he said, Ankara’s current asks sound maximalist. “In other words: Turkey is clearly trying to subdue the Turkish side without any conditions, and it demands the exit of all PKK fighters from the states of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq!! And this is what makes us ask … is what is really going on between Öcalan and Erdoğan a ‘peace process’?! What has Turkey done so far in order to make the peace process succeed?!” he said.

Local frictions—the part Washington didn’t fix

One persistent problem Saadoun emphasized—and one the Washington meeting did not resolve—is that not everyone on the regime side is following al-Sharaa’s line. “And most of the military factions affiliated with the Syrian state are not subject to the agreements of President al-Sharaa but rather see themselves as not concerned with them regarding the Kurds. And the provocations do not stop from the side of the government factions and militias—they may be a means of pressure from the government to subdue the Kurds—but as it appears and is likely, the legitimate president does not possess actual authority over all his factions,” he said.

He grounded that assessment in specific places the audience may recognize. “In Manbij, for example, issues of local representation and the presence of Arab factions that are not satisfied generate tensions, and in Sheikh Maqsoud there are sectarian/regional tensions that interact with changes in the security positions,” he said.

The risk, he continued, is ongoing friction rather than resolution. “The intermittent clashes show that the official integration is distant and does not immediately address local problems, for there are ongoing frictions over local influence, over the distribution of resources, and over who actually controls the security services,” he said.

A broader warning followed. “Integration may generate ‘organizational’ disputes more than it solves the root disputes unless it is accompanied by tangible steps for transitional justice, resource distribution, and real inclusion of Arab and Bedouin components,” he added.

Barkey, for his part, was more cautious on reports of clashes. “As for clashes, I am not sure. Some of the reports were not correct. I do not have good info,” he said.

Outlook after Washington

Barkey’s overall forecast remains restrained. “Finally, I think the status quo will continue. Damascus has to make some political concessions,” he said.

A final caution from him concerned al-Sharaa’s inner circle. “Al-Sharaa is obstinate, but he has to understand that for money/capital to come to Syria he has to demonstrate that it is going to be stable. My worry is that he is surrounded by jihadists. Even where he has appointed non jihadists, I heard in one case where the cabinet member complain that they have no power as he has appointed jihadists deputies who run the show,” he concluded.

That warning carries more weight now that al-Sharaa has met President Trump: International recognition is one thing; having reliable, nonideological operators to implement agreements with the Kurds is another.