The Media Line: Hamas Disarmament Loses Ground as Iran Tensions Return to Center Stage 

Hamas Disarmament Loses Ground as Iran Tensions Return to Center Stage 

Political pressure for postwar demilitarization has resurfaced without producing any binding framework or enforcement mechanism 

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line 

A brief effort to link Gaza’s postwar reconstruction to Hamas disarmament resurfaced last week, then quickly lost momentum as the US-Iran crisis reclaimed the diplomatic agenda. Regional and diplomatic channels signaled that reconstruction progress was being tied to steps toward disarmament, even though no formal ultimatum was issued. Within days, attention had shifted back to Washington and Tehran, leaving Gaza’s political future unresolved once again. No formal, binding disarmament framework has yet been agreed upon, leaving the issue suspended between political signaling and practical implementation. 

That shift was not only political. Diplomatic attention, security coordination, and international engagement once aimed at shaping Gaza’s postwar arrangements were increasingly redirected toward managing escalation with Iran. Once again, Gaza’s long-term governance and security questions briefly returned to the agenda, only to be overtaken by a larger regional crisis before any concrete mechanism or agreement could emerge. 

The latest effort was part of a broader US-led push, described in diplomatic discussions as the so-called “Board of Peace,” to shape postwar governance in Gaza. Within that framework, disarmament has been treated as a central condition for reconstruction funding, international involvement, and the possible deployment of outside administrative or security mechanisms in the Strip. Yet the initiative still lacks clear enforcement tools or guarantees strong enough to compel compliance by armed factions. Political pressure exists, but there is still no workable machinery to turn it into actual disarmament. 

Michael Milshtein, head of Palestinian Studies at the Moshe Dayan Center, told The Media Line Hamas has given no sign it is prepared to surrender its weapons, regardless of diplomatic pressure or the wider regional escalation. In his view, the group may be willing to discuss limits on certain weapons, but not full demilitarization. 

“We all heard Abu Obeida”—the nom de guerre used by the current anonymous spokesman for Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades—“on Sunday when he said in a very clear manner that Hamas is not ready even to consider any disarmament. And he actually said that all the reports about progress in the negotiations about disarmament—it’s all nonsense, because it’s very clear that Hamas is not ready to be flexible on this point.” 

“They can negotiate about the weapons, what kind of weapons they can keep, but they will never negotiate total disarmament.” 

Milshtein argued that even a US-backed postwar arrangement would be more likely to repackage Hamas than remove it. In his view, the group could accept a new governing façade while retaining armed power and political influence, echoing Hezbollah’s model in Lebanon. 

“All the Palestinians talk a lot today about what will happen on the day after the war with Iran. Many of them really wish that on the day after, Trump will promote a kind of political settlement in Gaza, based on the arrival of a bureaucratic government to Gaza, and even the arrival of international forces and their deployment in Gaza.” 

“It’s quite clear that Hamas is ready right now to accept all these demands, and actually to establish a kind of local model of Hezbollah in Gaza—means that they will keep their weapons, they will keep their influence in Gaza, but they will not really be ready for this total disarmament.” 

He tied that argument to a broader lesson about Israel’s military aims, saying total victory over Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran-backed actors is not realistically achievable in the way some leaders have framed it. 

“Right now, on all the fronts Israel deals with—I mean Lebanon and Iran and Hamas, Gaza—Netanyahu didn’t achieve any total victory and erasing the enemy. The enemy still exists—very, very weak, but dominant.” 

“We need to understand and realize that the warfare today, or the nature of our enemies, you cannot really achieve a kind of total eradication of these enemies from the map. You will need to repeat fighting them again and again and again.” 

That assessment also fits a broader shift in diplomatic discussions, where full disarmament is increasingly being contrasted with narrower or phased arrangements. Some proposals have explored restricting heavy weaponry, long-range capabilities, or offensive systems while allowing other forms of armament to remain in place, though none of those ideas has been formalized into a binding framework. 

Amjad Salfiti, a Palestinian British solicitor specializing in human rights and international law, approached the issue from a different direction. He argued that tying reconstruction to disarmament risks putting pressure on civilians rather than armed groups and may conflict with core humanitarian principles. 

“A key feature of the proposal is the conditioning of reconstruction assistance on the disarmament of Palestinian armed groups,” he told The Media Line. “Under international humanitarian law, humanitarian relief must be guided by necessity and impartiality and should not be made conditional on political or military concessions.” 

Salfiti said such proposals could create coercive conditions by making access to housing, healthcare, and infrastructure dependent on compliance with security demands. 

“Linking reconstruction to disarmament risks creating coercive conditions in which civilians are indirectly pressured to accept security demands in order to access essential services such as housing, healthcare, and infrastructure.” 

“This may be inconsistent with the prohibition on collective punishment and the principle of impartial humanitarian assistance.” 

He also questioned the framework’s legitimacy, arguing that it has been shaped largely through outside mediation without clear mechanisms for local consent, while lacking reciprocal obligations such as binding guarantees on hostilities or humanitarian access. 

“The reported framework appears to have been developed primarily through external mediation, without clear mechanisms for local consent or representation. This raises questions about legitimacy and compliance with the requirement that arrangements in affected territories act in the interests of the local population.” 

“The absence of clear reciprocal obligations—such as binding guarantees on cessation of hostilities or unimpeded humanitarian access—creates an asymmetrical structure that may undermine established norms governing armed conflict and occupation.” 

Salfiti further warned that phased reconstruction tied to compliance could create legal and ethical problems if aid is distributed selectively rather than according to need. 

“The proposed suggestion that reconstruction could be delivered in phases based on compliance introduces further legal and ethical concerns. Selective aid distribution risks violating the principle of non-discrimination in humanitarian assistance, which requires that relief be provided based solely on need.” 

Taken together, these objections suggest that even if disarmament were politically attainable, the mechanisms now under discussion could still face serious legal challenges. 

That has left the international response divided. While the United States has driven much of the current initiative, European states and multilateral institutions have signaled caution, especially over the legal implications of conditional reconstruction and the lack of a clearly mandated international framework. 

For Gaza’s civilian population, estimated at around two million people and already facing severe humanitarian conditions, the consequences are immediate. Reconstruction, governance, and security shape daily life, access to essential services, and any prospect of long-term stability. 

At this stage, Hamas disarmament remains a diplomatic objective without a workable path to implementation. No clear framework has emerged for disarmament, reconstruction, or governance, leaving Gaza’s civilians still waiting for answers while the wider region pulls the world’s attention elsewhere.