The Media Line: Can the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism Prevent Violence? Lessons From Australia

Can the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism Prevent Violence? Lessons From Australia

Canberra’s adoption of the IHRA definition clarifies how antisemitism is identified but leaves policing, prosecutions, and free speech law unchanged

By Steven Ganot/The Media Line

When Australia formally adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in October 2021, the government framed the move as a statement of principle and a practical tool for identifying antisemitism. Critics argued that the definition’s illustrative examples, including those touching on Israel-related discourse, could be misapplied in ways that chill lawful speech.

The Bondi Beach massacre has pushed that debate into sharper relief. Australia’s experience, however, points to a basic reality: A policy tool designed to help institutions recognize antisemitism is not intended to prevent attacks, disrupt violent plots, or substitute for policing and intelligence work.

What Australia ‘Adopted’ When It Adopted IHRA

The IHRA text is explicitly described as a non-legally binding working definition. In practice, national “adoption” means the government endorses a reference framework that public bodies may use for education, training, and consistent terminology. It does not change what conduct is criminal, what speech is unlawful, or what powers police and courts possess.

In Australia, adoption occurred at the policy level. The definition was not incorporated into legislation, nor was it written into criminal or civil statutes. Its function is descriptive rather than regulatory.

IHRA and Free Speech in Australia: Has Anything Actually Changed?

Australia’s adoption of IHRA did not amend any speech-related law and did not create new crimes. That point is central to understanding its impact.

The country’s most prominent federal provision governing race-related speech is Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which makes certain public acts unlawful if they are reasonably likely to offend, insult, humiliate, or intimidate on the basis of race or national or ethnic origin. Section 18D of the same law provides broad exemptions for expression done reasonably and in good faith, including artistic works, academic debate, and fair comment on matters of public interest.

IHRA did not alter this framework. The definition was not incorporated into Section 18C, and it did not narrow the protections in Section 18D. Speech that was lawful before adoption remains lawful afterward, and the legal tests applied by courts and tribunals have not changed because a definition was endorsed by the government.

The same applies to policing. IHRA is not a charging standard. It does not govern arrest powers, search authorities, or evidentiary rules. Criminal investigations and prosecutions rely on established criminal law, not on a nonbinding definitional framework.

Universities have been a major arena for debate, but even there, IHRA has not imposed legal obligations. Some institutions reference the definition in guidance or training, while Australia’s main university umbrella group has supported a separate, locally tailored, nonbinding antisemitism definition. These choices reflect governance and political judgment, not a legal mandate created by IHRA adoption.

How Australian Governments Use IHRA in Practice—and Where They Do Not

In practice, Australian governments use the IHRA definition primarily as a common-language tool. It appears in public statements, policy signaling, and education or awareness contexts where consistency in describing antisemitism is considered useful.

By contrast, the definition does not appear as an operative standard in criminal statutes. It does not determine whether conduct meets the elements of an offense, and it does not function as a legal threshold for prosecution. Even where government agencies refer to IHRA, it is generally treated as guidance rather than enforceable law.

Antisemitism, Extremism, and Violence: What IHRA Can—and Cannot—Address

Australia’s experience highlights the importance of separating antisemitism, extremist ideology, and acts of violence.

Antisemitism refers to hostility or prejudice toward Jews, which the IHRA definition seeks to help identify in rhetoric and behavior. Extremist ideologies may incorporate antisemitic beliefs, but not all antisemitism reflects organized extremism, and not all extremist beliefs lead to violence. Acts of violence are addressed through criminal law and counterterrorism systems that focus on intent, capability, planning, and unlawful acts.

For that reason, IHRA functions as a diagnostic and educational framework. It can help institutions recognize antisemitic patterns, explain motive, and standardize language. It does not diagnose radicalization pathways, disrupt networks, or operate as a counterterrorism tool.

Antisemitism Policy vs. Criminal Law: Drawing the Line

Australia’s approach illustrates the difference between naming harm and punishing crime.

Policy definitions like IHRA help governments and institutions identify antisemitism consistently, including in cases where conduct may be harmful but still lawful. Civil anti-discrimination and anti-vilification laws provide remedies in defined circumstances, often with explicit protections for legitimate public debate. Criminal law addresses threats, incitement that crosses criminal thresholds, weapons offenses, assault, homicide, and terrorism-related conduct.

Because these tools serve different purposes, adoption of a definition cannot deliver outcomes that belong to law enforcement and the courts.

How Australia Compares With Other Democracies, Including Israel

Australia’s approach aligns with a broader international pattern. Countries such as the UK, Germany, Canada, and the US have endorsed or adopted the IHRA definition as a reference framework rather than incorporating it into criminal law. In each case, governments have emphasized that the definition is nonbinding and intended to assist with understanding and identifying antisemitism, not to create new offenses.

Israel’s relationship to IHRA is distinct. Israeli institutions and lawmakers have expressed support for the definition as a working reference, and the Knesset has taken steps encouraging its use. At the same time, Israel has not adopted IHRA as a criminal-law standard. Like other democracies, it addresses antisemitic conduct through existing criminal and civil laws rather than through the definition itself.

Across these systems, public debate about free speech has accompanied adoption, particularly in academic and political contexts. There is little evidence, however, that adoption alone has produced widespread legal censorship.

Does Any Country Use IHRA as a Criminal Standard?

As a rule, countries that adopt or endorse IHRA explicitly describe it as non-legally binding. Some states criminalize conduct often associated with antisemitism, such as certain forms of Holocaust denial or incitement, but those prohibitions arise from domestic statutes, not from IHRA itself.

Courts or agencies may occasionally reference the definition as an interpretive context. That differs from using IHRA as the legal standard that directly determines criminal liability.

A Lesson in Proportion

Australia’s experience points to a measured conclusion. A definition can help societies name antisemitism clearly and consistently, improving institutional understanding and public discourse. It cannot, on its own, prevent violence.

Violence requires operational responses grounded in intelligence, policing, and criminal law. Hatred requires moral clarity. Policy definitions can support the latter, but they cannot replace the former.