The Media Line: Andy Burnham and the Middle East: What Britain’s Incoming Prime Minister Is Likely To Do 

Andy Burnham and the Middle East: What Britain’s Incoming Prime Minister Is Likely To Do 

Burnham appears likely to take a more openly critical line on Israel’s conduct in Gaza than Sir Keir Starmer initially did, but his record points to a shift in tone and pressure, not an upheaval in Britain’s wider Middle East policy 

By The Media Line Staff 

Andy Burnham is set to become Britain’s prime minister on Monday after the governing Labour Party selected him to replace Sir Keir Starmer. Before returning to Parliament in June, Burnham spent nine years as mayor of Greater Manchester. He previously held senior government positions, including health secretary, during the administrations of Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. 

Burnham enters Downing Street with considerable domestic political experience but a comparatively limited record in foreign affairs. His clearest Middle East positions concern Israel, the Palestinians, and Gaza. On Iran, the Gulf states, and most of the wider region, he has said much less. 

How Burnham Reached Downing Street 

Burnham returned to Parliament by winning a by-election in Makerfield, giving him the Commons seat needed to seek the Labour leadership. He was formally elected party leader on July 17 after receiving the support of 379 Labour MPs and 23 affiliated organizations. 

Because Labour already holds a substantial parliamentary majority, Burnham can become prime minister without an immediate general election. He will arrive with overwhelming support inside the Parliamentary Labour Party but without a personal nationwide electoral mandate for his foreign policy. 

Gaza and October 7 

The strongest indications of Burnham’s likely Middle East policy come from his statements about the Hamas-led October 7 attack and the subsequent war in Gaza. 

Burnham has condemned the Hamas attack and sought to reassure Britain’s Jewish community that his criticism of Israel will not weaken Labour’s opposition to antisemitism. At the same time, he has apologized for Labour’s initial response to the war, saying the party “didn’t get it right” and that Britain was too slow to call for a ceasefire. 

“We’ve got to do more to put pressure on the Israeli government,” he said in July. “But let’s be honest, the UK was too slow to call for a ceasefire. And we must now do more to strengthen our approach.” 

That marks a change from Starmer’s early post-October 7 positioning, which placed greater emphasis on Israel’s right to defend itself and resisted immediate calls for a ceasefire. 

Burnham has described the destruction in Gaza as appalling and said there is “increasing evidence” that war crimes may have been committed. He has stopped short of declaring that Israel committed genocide, saying such determinations belong to international courts rather than politicians. 

Israel, Palestine, and Settlements 

Burnham’s record on Israel and the Palestinians predates the Gaza war. 

In 2012, he visited the West Bank as part of a parliamentary delegation. One of the delegation’s organizers later recalled that Burnham was struck by the extent of settlements, checkpoints, barriers and military infrastructure and questioned whether a viable Palestinian state remained possible. 

During his 2015 Labour leadership campaign, Burnham supported recognition of Palestinian statehood and described Israeli settlements as illegal and immoral. He also condemned Hamas terrorism and opposed the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement against Israel, favoring measures directed specifically at settlement products instead. 

That year, Burnham joined Labour Friends of Israel and said that Israel would be his first foreign destination if he became Labour leader. There is no clear public record showing that he subsequently made such a visit. 

His current position therefore represents a change in emphasis rather than a complete ideological reversal. Burnham continues to support a two-state solution and does not advocate isolating Israel, but he has indicated that his government could pursue additional sanctions against people or organizations involved in violence and consider banning trade in goods produced in Israeli settlements. 

Israel and Antisemitism 

Burnham has insisted that strong criticism of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is compatible with uncompromising opposition to antisemitism. 

“There is no contradiction between a zero-tolerance approach to antisemitism and holding the Netanyahu government to account,” he said. 

That distinction will matter politically. Labour spent years trying to rebuild relations with British Jewish communities after the antisemitism crisis under former party leader Jeremy Corbyn. Burnham will face pressure from pro-Palestinian Labour members seeking stronger action against Israel while also being expected to prevent criticism of Israeli policy from becoming hostility toward Jewish people or institutions. 

Military Intervention and Iraq 

Burnham should not be portrayed simply as a politician opposed to military action in the Middle East. 

As a Labour MP, he voted in 2003 for the motion that authorized Britain’s participation in the Iraq War. He later voted against several proposed inquiries into the decision and conduct of the war. 

During the 2013 parliamentary confrontation over Syria’s use of chemical weapons, Burnham backed Labour’s more restrictive approach, which required further consideration by the United Nations and another Commons vote before British forces could participate in military action. 

His record suggests neither automatic support for intervention nor categorical opposition to it. As prime minister, he is likely to face immediate decisions over the US-Iran conflict, protection of British forces and facilities, maritime security, and any international effort to stabilize shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Iran 

Burnham has not yet presented a detailed Iran policy. 

He has referred to Iran and the deteriorating international security environment when arguing that Britain needs stronger armed forces and greater domestic defense production. That establishes his concern about preparedness but does not reveal how he would approach Tehran’s nuclear program, sanctions, direct military confrontation or diplomacy. 

The developing US-Iran war may force Burnham to define those positions much sooner than expected. His choices will include whether to provide diplomatic, logistical or military support to Washington and how to balance Britain’s alliance with the United States against pressure to avoid another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. 

The Gulf and Wider Region 

There is little public evidence from which to construct a distinct Burnham policy toward Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, or Kuwait. 

Britain’s relationships with the Gulf states involve defense cooperation, intelligence, trade, energy and investment. Those ties are deeply embedded in British policy and are unlikely to disappear merely because the prime minister changes. That expectation reflects institutional continuity, though, not a detailed policy Burnham has personally announced. 

The same limitation applies to Syria and Lebanon. Burnham has not articulated a developed position on Syria’s new government, Hezbollah’s weapons, Israeli operations in Lebanon or the future of British engagement with Damascus. 

Burnham’s public record offers little basis for assessing how he would approach many of the other conflicts, bilateral relationships and diplomatic disputes that regularly demand a British prime minister’s attention. His years as Greater Manchester mayor brought him into contact with diaspora communities and foreign representatives, but municipal engagement does not amount to a developed national foreign-policy program. 

The United States 

Burnham has given no indication that he intends to weaken Britain’s strategic relationship with Washington. 

He may disagree with President Donald Trump over individual Middle East decisions, especially if the American president seeks British participation in military operations against Iran. Yet NATO, intelligence cooperation, nuclear policy, and the broader US-UK security relationship are likely to impose strong limits on any divergence. 

Continuity With a Sharper Tone 

Burnham’s probable Middle East approach can be described with more confidence on Gaza than anywhere else. 

He appears more willing than Starmer initially was to acknowledge Palestinian suffering, criticize Israeli conduct, consider settlement-related trade restrictions and use sanctions as leverage. His history also includes support for Palestinian statehood and concern about settlement expansion. 

Yet Burnham has condemned Hamas, rejected treating genocide as a political determination, opposed a general boycott of Israel and emphasized zero tolerance for antisemitism. He has not advocated breaking Britain’s alliance with the United States or dismantling its strategic relationships with Gulf governments. 

The likeliest outcome is not a foreign-policy revolution. It is a British government that speaks more critically about Israel, places greater public emphasis on Palestinian rights and tests targeted economic pressure, while proceeding cautiously across Iran, the Gulf, Syria and Lebanon. 

How far that distinction survives contact with war, alliance commitments, and the practical demands of governing will become clearer only after Burnham enters Downing Street.