The Media Line: A ‘Not-Quite-Ceasefire’: UNIFIL–IDF Incident Raises Concerns of Escalation 

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A ‘Not-Quite-Ceasefire’: UNIFIL–IDF Incident Raises Concerns of Escalation 

Lebanese source: ‘UNIFIL’s planned drawdown leaves the south at risk of a deterrence vacuum the LAF is not equipped to fill.’ 

By Giorgia Valenti/The Media Line 

Israeli strikes in recent days have killed Hezbollah members in multiple parts of Lebanon, including in the Bekaa and the south—one reported in Al-Nabi Shayth (Baalbek) and another near An-Naqoura in Tyre—highlighting how the conflict has settled into a pattern of daily, bounded violence despite ceasefire language. As of Oct. 27, 2025, the front remains governed by daily, calibrated strikes and patrols rather than formal ceasefire mechanisms. 

That drumbeat coincided with a rare flashpoint involving UN peacekeepers. Over the weekend near Kfar Kila, a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol shot down an Israeli surveillance drone. UNIFIL said the unnamed aerial vehicle (UAV) flew “aggressively” over its patrol. Soon after, a drone dropped a grenade, and an Israeli tank fired toward the peacekeepers. No injuries were reported. The IDF said the downed UAV was on routine reconnaissance and denied endangering peacekeepers, calling the grenade a site-denial measure. 

The conflicting accounts highlight how thin the margin for error has become along the Blue Line. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) tasks Lebanon with deploying the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the south, restricting unauthorized weapons, and respecting the Blue Line, while UNIFIL supports implementation and deconfliction, with the latter running through UNIFIL’s tripartite meetings in Naqoura with the LAF and IDF—useful for crisis management even when enforcement is thin. 

Diplomatically, Washington is re-engaging. US envoy Morgan Ortagus is in Beirut for talks focused on disarming Hezbollah under the 2024 truce framework after days of intensified Israeli strikes. Her stop follows consultations in Israel and border tours with defense officials, part of a broader shift that leans on direct US channels as UN-centric frameworks strain. 

Eyal Zisser, vice rector of Tel Aviv University and a specialist on Lebanon–Syria–Israel–Arab relations, described to The Media Line a steady-state conflict governed by daily tactics rather than grand designs: 

“Since November 2024, it’s more of the same: a ceasefire not observed by either side. On the Israeli side, you see a free hand at the tactical level. It’s not a major war, not something dramatic, but every day there’s a limited attack here or there—killing one member of Hezbollah, no more, no less. … From time to time, there’s engagement with the Lebanese army and with UNIFIL, but it’s limited and contained by all sides,” he said. 

Pressed on the prospect of a larger Israeli campaign, he argued the threshold remains high: “As long as Hezbollah doesn’t retaliate and keeps it at a low level—this is its policy—nothing will happen. … As long as nothing changes on the ground, I think it will continue to be the same as now,” he added. 

On UNIFIL and the LAF, Zisser was blunt: “UNIFIL has less than a year; it will go. Nobody regards it as effective or as a player. It doesn’t disturb and it doesn’t contribute; it has no meaning and is generally ignored,” he noted. 

“The Lebanese army …  maybe a gate to a better future, but for the time being, it does nothing. There are open channels that help contain deterioration or escalation, but it doesn’t play a role—it cannot; it doesn’t want to; it doesn’t get orders from the Lebanese government,” he added. 

He extended the logic to Lebanese state capacity and Palestinian factions: “The Lebanese government hopes Hezbollah will disarm itself, but it will not. … Because it is not doing anything, there is no pressure on Israel from the United States or any other country to stop its activities against these threats,” he said. 

“The government in Lebanon managed to reach an agreement with the Palestinian Authority regarding Fatah-affiliated factions in Lebanon, but they didn’t touch Hamas and Islamic Jihad. … If you base your policy on hope, it will not happen, and the situation will continue as it is,” he added. 

From Beirut, Azzam, a Lebanese political analyst who asked to be identified only by a first name, said to The Media Line that the September 2024 spike in hostilities “shattered any functional rules of engagement,” leaving a reality governed by raw deterrence. Hezbollah, he argued, “has adopted a lower profile in the south while retaining depth across the country,” while Israel has responded with a “borderless strike campaign” targeting Hezbollah assets nationwide. The LAF attempts to reassert state presence without directly confronting Hezbollah, relying on ambiguity to preserve internal cohesion, he noted. 

He also said that UNIFIL–LAF coordination has improved procedurally—joint patrols, de-confliction with the IDF in Naqoura—but functions “more as damage control than robust enforcement,” a point demonstrated by the weekend drone incident. Looking ahead, he warned that “UNIFIL’s planned drawdown leaves the south at risk of a deterrence vacuum the LAF is not equipped to fill.” 

On the aims of any future Israeli move, he argued Israel would seek not just to degrade munitions but to dismantle the “enabling environment.” 

“The campaign’s objectives would go beyond degrading Hezbollah’s arsenal—dismantling the enabling environment: the political cover, civilian infrastructure, and logistical systems that sustain Hezbollah’s deterrence model,” he noted. 

“Three realistic triggers in case of an Israeli campaign can occur: a Hezbollah operation causing mass Israeli casualties; hard evidence of rebuilding strategic capabilities along the Blue Line; or continued paralysis in Beirut read as a green light for unilateral action. With Gaza relatively quiet, Israel’s attention is north—the window for Lebanon to act is weeks, not months,” he explained. 

“Contingency planning reflects this grim outlook; the IDF is preparing for a rapid, high-intensity strike campaign designed to impose new deterrence rules; Hezbollah, meanwhile, is dispersing assets and bracing for a drawn-out fight; the LAF, under-equipped and politically boxed in, is unlikely to intervene decisively,” he added. 

For Lebanon, Azzam said the stakes are structural: an Israeli offensive would likely hit southern population centers, logistics hubs in the Bekaa, and command and control in southern Beirut—while diplomacy pivots from multilateral UN tracks to shorter, US-brokered, leverage-driven engagements. 

Beyond the operatives killed, border communities on both sides remain partially displaced, with schools and small businesses cycling open and closed as exchanges of fire spike. The Kfar Kila incident shows how easily routine surveillance and patrol patterns can intersect with split-second force-protection decisions—raising the risk of unintended escalation. Coupled with targeted killings across multiple regions of Lebanon and renewed US shuttle efforts, the episode illustrates a front that is stable only so long as each side keeps its responses finely calibrated.